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Abstract
This paper uses an adapted version of the linear tracing procedure,
suggested by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), in order to discriminate be-
tween two types of multiple Nash equilibria. Equilibria of the same
type are pay-off equivalent in the analysed multiple-unit unit price
auction where two sellers compete in order to serve a fixed demand.
The equilibria where the firm with the larger capacity bids the max-
imum price, serves the residual demand and is undercut by the low
capacity firm that sells its total capacity risk dominate the equilibria
where the roles are interchanged.
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1 Introduction
Lots of meaningful economic applications of game theory generate multiple
equilibria. Often they are due to co-ordination problems similar to the by now
famous Battle of the Sexes. In these sort of games the players have divergent
preferences over the different equilibria and therefore pareto dominance and
other well established criteria for equilibrium selection cannot discriminate
among the different Nash equilibria whereas risk dominance which has been
introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) does a good job and is easy to
apply in 2×2 games with asymmetric players (see Cabrales et al., 2000, for a
more thorough discussion and some endorsing evidence from experiments).
If the players can however choose from more than two strategies applying
risk dominance as an equilibrium selection device becomes much more com-
plicated, because then the full tracing procedure, developed by Harsanyi
(1975), needs to be applied.1 This is done, for example, by van Damme and
Hurkens (2004) who apply risk dominance to a sequential pricing game with
two firms with different constant marginal costs and differentiated products.
They show that applying risk dominance only to the reduced game where
firms are restricted to the strategies chosen in the two existing Nash equilib-
ria selects the wrong equilibrium in their context. If the criterion is properly
applied, taking into account the full range of possible deviations from the
equilibrium strategies, then the equilibrium where the more efficient firm
acts as a price leader and the less efficient firm as a follower risk dominates
the one where the firms take the opposite roles. The latter equilibrium is,
however, selected if the criterion of risk dominance is applied to the reduced
game where the two players are restricted to their prices as a leader and as
a follower.
Here we consider a particular form of a multiple-unit unit price auction which
is known for generating multiple equilibria when the firms in the market are
sufficiently capacity constrained (see e.g. Moreno and Ubeda, 2006; Crampes
and Creti, 2005; Le Coq, 2002; Boom, 2002) and which has been used in order
to model wholesale electricity markets. We show that similar to the case
considered by van Damme and Hurkens (2004) applying risk dominance only
to a reduced version of the game might select the wrong equilibrium. Then we
analyse the auction with the full strategy set. Contrary to van Damme and
Hurkens (2004), we can only discriminate between the two types of equilibria
when we discretize the strategy space and turn the game into a finite game
as has been demanded by Harsanyi (1975) and Schanuel et al. (1991). In our
1In some instances like in Amir and Stepanova (2006) it is nevertheless possible to
reduce the game to a 2×2 game and analyse this in the usual way.
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setting risk dominance selects the (pay-off equivalent) equilibria where the
firm with the larger capacity acts as a monopolist on the residual demand
and the firm with the smaller capacity undercuts sufficiently and supplies its
whole capacity to the market.
2 The model
Suppose that a demand of x units of an item shall be satisfied via a unit-price
auction. There are two potential suppliers A and B which can produce up
to their maximum capacity of kA and kB. Their marginal cost of production
is constant and for the sake of simplicity assumed to be equal to zero. We
assume that both firms’ capacities are sufficient and necessary to satisfy
demand, meaning
kA + kB > x > max{kA, kB} (1)
In the auction each firm i = A,B has to announce its reservation price
pi which is the lowest price at which it is willing to produce and supply the
product up to its total capacity ki. The price bids are restricted to 0 ≤ pi ≤ p¯
and to a multiple of the smallest allowable money unit ε with ε < p¯/2. The
auctioneer sets the price which balances supply and demand. Since he needs
always the capacities of both firms for this, the auction price can be described
by
p(pi, pj) = pi if pi ≥ pj with i, j = A,B and i 6= j. (2)
The firm that announced a price below the market clearing price delivers its
total capacity at the market clearing price, whereas the firm which announced
the market clearing price is rationed to the production level necessary to
balance supply and demand. With identical announcements both firm share
the market. The produced volumes therefore depend on the price bids and
are given by
yi(pi, pj) =

ki if pi < pj,
ki
2
+
x−kj
2
if pi = pj,
x− kj if pi > pj,
(3)
with i, j = A,B and i 6= j. Thus, firm i’s pay-off, given the price bids (pi, pj),
is
pii(pi, pj) = p(pi, pj)yi(pi, pj). (4)
For this setting Crampes and Creti (2005) and Le Coq (2002) have already
proven the following proposition
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Proposition 1 There are two types of Nash equilibria in pure strategies: one
with pA = p¯ and pB ≤ p¯(x − kB)/kA ≡ pB, and another with pB = p¯ and
pA ≤ p¯(x− kA)/kB ≡ pA. The wholesale price is the same (p(pi, pj) = p¯) for
both types of equilibria, but the profits in equilibrium differ:
pii(pi, p¯) = p¯ki ≥ pii(p¯, pj) = p¯(x−kj)with pi ≤ pi, pj ≤ pj, i, j = A,B and i 6= j.
Proof: See appendix A of Le Coq (2002) or the proof of proposition 3 in
Crampes and Creti (2005), using that the constant marginal cost of generat-
ing electricity is identical and equal to zero by assumption.
Thus, there are multiple Nash equilibria of each of the two types in this
game. Each equilibrium of the same type is pay-off equivalent whereas those
belonging to different types are not. Each firm prefers an equilibrium where it
itself chooses to undercut its rival and the rival chooses the maximum price.
Thus, if this game represents only one intermediate stage in a multistage
game, one (type of) equilibrium needs to be selected and pareto dominance
as a selection criterion is not an option. In addition even side payments would
not change the picture because, no matter which type of Nash equilibrium
prevails, the aggregate profits of the two firms are always identical because
piA(p¯, pB)+piB(p¯, pB) = piA(pA, p¯)+piB(pA, p¯) = p¯x with pi ≤ pi and i = A,B
holds.
3 Applying Risk Dominance to a Reduced Ver-
sion of the Game
Obviously, it is not straightforward, how to reduce the considered game to a
2×2 game, especially since there are multiple Nash equilibria of each type.
Suppose, however, for the sake of illustration that each firm i is constrained
to play either the maximum price p¯ or the price p
i
which ensures that the
rival does not want to undercut the firm. This reduced game can then be
represented by the normal form given in figure 1. This game has the two
Nash equilibria in pure strategies (pA, pB) = (p¯, pB) and (pA, pB) = (pA, p¯)
which are each also equilibria in the original game and represent each one
type of equilibrium. In addition the strategy pA = pA weakly dominates
pA = p¯ as long as kA > kB. Applying the criterion of risk dominance to this
reduced version of the game yields proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Risk dominance selects the Nash equilibrium (pA, pB) = (pA, p¯)
in the game presented in figure 1 as long as kA > kB holds.
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Firm A
Firm B
p¯ p
B
p¯ p¯(x−kB+kA)
2
, p¯(x−kA+kB)
2
p¯(x− kB), p¯kB
p
A
p¯kA, p¯(x− kA) p¯(x− kB), p¯(x−kB)(x−kA)kA
Figure 1: A Reduced Version of the Game for kA > kB
Proof: The Nash equilibrium (pA, pB) = (pA, p¯) risk dominates the Nash
equilibrium (pA, pB) = (p¯, pB) because[
piA(pA, p¯)− piA(p¯, p¯)
] [
piB(pA, p¯)− piB(pA, pB)
]
>
[
piA(p¯, pB)− piA(pA, pB)
]
·
[
piB(p¯, pB)− piB(p¯, p¯)
]
⇔ p¯
2(3kA − x− kB)(x− kA)(kA + kB − x)
2kA
> 0
holds for kA + kB > x > kA > kB.
Proposition 2 hinges on the assumption that the firms are playing the highest
undercutting price, if they undercut. Assuming any other undercutting price
compatible with each type of Nash equilibrium would change the pay-offs of
the two firms in the south-east cell of the normal form in figure 1 and might
lead to other conclusions than the one drawn in proposition 2.2
4 Applying Risk Dominance to the Full Game
As van Damme and Hurkens (2004) have already pointed out, reducing the
strategy space to a 2×2 game can be misleading when selecting a Nash equi-
librium on the grounds of risk dominance. This is also true in our case. In
addition we do not only have to apply the concept of risk dominance to two
equilibria as in their case but to potentially multiple equilibria of each type if
ε is sufficiently small to allow for more than just one price below the critical
level p
i
for i = A,B.
In order to figure out which Nash equilibrium risk dominates, we need to
proceed in two steps. First we have to determine the bi-centric prior of the
2This is for example the case if we alternatively restricted each firm’s strategies to
pi = p¯ and pi = 0 with i = A,B.
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two players and then we have to apply a tracing procedure (see Harsanyi and
Selten, 1988; van Damme and Hurkens, 2004, for the details). Given that
we do not have two equilibria but mainly two groups of equilibria between
which we want to discriminate we need to adapt the determination of the
bi-centric priors.
Following as close as possible the argument in Harsanyi and Selten (1988)
and in van Damme and Hurkens (2004) we can arrive at Lemma 1
Lemma 1 Player i’s prior belief about Player j with i, j = A,B and i 6= j
is that he is facing the mixed strategy
mj = bj(Zj)
defined in (5) where Zj is a uniformly distributed random variable on [0, 1].
Proof: Suppose, firm j believes that firm i plays p¯ with probability zj and
with probability 1 − zj a uniform distribution on [0, pi], since all pi ≤ pi
generate the same profit in all the Nash equilibria where firm j chooses
pj = p¯. Then firm j’s profit is
p˜ij(pi, pj, zj) =

zj
p¯(kj+x−ki)
2
+ (1− zj)p¯(x− ki) for pj = p¯,
zj p¯kj + (1− zj)pj(x− ki) for pi ≤ pj < p¯,
zj p¯kj + (1− zj)
[
p2jkj(2x−2ki−kj)
2p¯(x−ki) +
p¯(x−ki)
2
]
for 0 ≤ pj < pi.
From firm j’s profit maximization firm j’s best response bj can be derived
bj(zj) =

p¯ if 0 ≤ zj < z˜j(ε)
p¯ and p¯− ε each
with probability 1
2
if zj = z˜j(ε)
p¯− ε if z˜j(ε) < zj ≤ 1,
(5)
where the following definition is used:
z˜j(ε) ≡ 2(x− ki)ε
2(x− ki)ε+ p¯(ki + kj − x) . (6)
Player i does not know the subjective probability zj which player j assigns
to i choosing the maximum price p¯. Applying the principle of insufficient
reason, player i considers zj as being uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
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In order to apply the linear tracing procedure we need to look at a game with
the same strategies for both players, but where firm i’s pay-off ui(pi, pj, t,mj),
i, j = A,B and i 6= j, is a linear combination of the pay-off from the original
game given in (4) and the pay-off from the original game, given that the
opponent chooses always the prior mj defined in lemma 1:
ui(pi, pj, t,mj) = (1− t)pii(pi,mj) + tpii(pi, pj) with t ∈ [0, 1]. (7)
From the analysis of this alternative game for all t ∈ [0, 1] we can derive
lemma 2:
Lemma 2 Suppose ki > kj with i, j = A,B and i 6= j. Then the pure Nash
equilibria with (pi, pj) = (p¯, pj), and pj < pj(t), as defined in (13), exists for
the game with the pay-off function given in (7) if t ≥ ti(ε) with
ti(ε) ≡ p¯(ki + kj − x) [p¯(ki + kj − x)− ε(2ki − x)][
p¯(p¯− ε)(ki + kj − x)2 + εp¯(2x− ki − kj)(ki + kj − x)
+4ε2(x− ki)(x− kj)
]−1
. (8)
The pure Nash equilibria with (pi, pj) = (pi, p¯), and pi < pi(t), as defined in
(16), exists for the game with the pay-off function given in (7) if t > t¯j(ε)
with
t¯j(ε) ≡ p¯(ki + kj − x) [(p¯− ε)(ki + kj − x) + 2ε(ki − kj)][
p¯(p¯− ε)(ki + kj − x)2 + εp¯(2x− 2kj)(ki + kj − x)
+4ε2(x− ki)(x− kj)
]−1
. (9)
Proof: See the Appendix.
Now we are in the position to derive the main result of our paper, given in
proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If the capacities of the two firms satisfy ki > kj with i, j =
A,B and i 6= j then the Nash equilibria with (pi, pj) = (p¯, pj) and pj < pj
dominate the equilibria with (pi, pj) = (pi, p¯) and pi < pi, where pi and pj are
defined in proposition 1, from a risk point of view.
Proof: Comparing the two critical values for the linear weight t in the
alternative game given in lemma 2 we can distinguish three cases
6
(i) If the two firms capacities satisfy kj < x/2 < ki < x < ki + kj two
situations can occur
0 < ti(ε) < t¯j(ε) < 1 if 0 < ε <
p¯(ki + kj − x)
2ki − x and
ti(ε) ≤ 0 < t¯j(ε) < 1 if
p¯(ki + kj − x)
2ki − x ≤ ε <
p¯
2
(ii) If the two firms capacities satisfy x/2 ≤ kj < ki < x < ki + kj the
relationship
0 < ti(ε) < t¯j(ε) < 1 holds for all 0 < ε <
p¯
2
.
(iii) If the two firms capacities satisfy x/2 < kj = ki < x < ki + kj then
0 < ti(ε) = t¯j(ε) < 1 holds for all 0 < ε <
p¯
2
.
From these comparisons we see that the support of t for which equilibria
with (pi, pj) = (p¯, pj) and pj < pj(t) exist is larger in the relevant range [0, 1]
than the support for which the equilibria (pi, pj) = (pi, p¯) and pi < pi(t) exist
as long as ki > kj holds. Since limt→1 pi(t) = pi and limt→1 pj(t) = pj, the
conclusion can be drawn.
Note that for all t always two types of pure Nash equilibria exist, one where
the large firm bids high and the small firm bids sufficiently low and the other
way round. However, bidding high for 0 < t < ti means for both firms to
bid p¯− 2ε and, thus, still below the prices p¯ and p¯− ε which correspond to
the price levels on which they have positive priors for their components (see
Lemma 1 and the Appendix). For the larger firm loosing on the price when
bidding semi-high instead of really high and getting most of the time in both
cases the residual demand is sooner more important than having a smaller
and smaller chance to match the rivals high (prior) price or to even undercut
it and then to sell more. The large firm’s residual demand is always higher
than the small firm’s residual demand. Therefore the smaller firm does not
lose that much on sticking longer on semi-high prices in order to have a
certain chance to sell more if the rival sticks to the prior. This intuition is
confirmed in the following corollary 1.
Corollary 1 If the the two firm’s capacities are identical, ki = kj with
i, j = A,B and i 6= j, or if the strategy space of the two firms becomes
continuous with ε → 0 then the different types of Nash equilibria cannot be
ranked according to the risk dominance criterion because ti(ε) = t¯j(ε).
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With ε→ 0 the loss on the price from slightly undercutting the priors of the
rival firm becomes negligible compared to the maximum price. Both firms bid
the maximum price instead of slightly undercutting the priors only when the
priors are certainly not played any more because ti = t¯j = 1. With identical
capacities both firms lose always the same amount from not bidding the top
price instead of the semi-top and therefore they switch from semi-high to
high prices at the exact same ti = t¯j = t ∈ (0, 1).
5 Conclusions
We have shown in this paper how one can adapt the linear tracing procedure
in order to rank two groups of Nash equilibria from a risk dominance per-
spective when the Nash equilibria in each group are pay-off equivalent, but
cannot be pareto-ranked across the groups. In the considered two-players
multi-unit unit-price auction the larger firm in terms of capacity bids high
and sells the residual demand whereas the smaller firm bids sufficiently low
and sells its total capacity.
Considering only a restricted game where the strategy space is reduced to
a 2 × 2-game leads easily to wrong conclusions, mainly because strategies
which are not equilibrium strategies in the original game are excluded from
the analysis although they may play a major role (as our discussion of high
versus semi-high prices in the last section shows).
If we either introduce symmetric players (here firms with identical capacities)
or a continuous strategy space a ranking of the two types of Nash equilibria
from a risk perspective is not possible anymore.
Appendix
Assume ki ≥ kj. The alternative game’s pay-off function given in (7) for
t→ 0 implies that limt→0 ui(pi, pj, t,mj) = pii(pi,mj) with
pii(pi,mj) =

∫ z˜j(ε)
0
p¯
x−kj+ki
2
dz +
∫ 1
z˜j(ε)
p¯(x− kj)dz if pi = p¯,∫ z˜j(ε)
0
p¯kidz +
∫ 1
z˜j(ε)
(p¯− ε)x−kj+ki
2
if pi = p¯− ε,∫ z˜j(ε)
0
p¯kidz +
∫ 1
z˜j(ε)
(p¯− ε)kidz if pi < p¯− ε,
(10)
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and i, j = A,B and i 6= j. From the analysis of this profit function it becomes
obvious that firm i’s best response is given by
bi

< p¯− ε if ε < p¯(ki+kj−x)
2ki−x
= p¯ or pi < p¯− ε if ε = p¯(ki+kj−x)2ki−x
= p¯ if ε > p¯(ki+kj−x)
2ki−x
Confronting the two firms’ best response functions and taking into account
that
p¯(ki + kj − x)
2kj − x >
p¯(ki + kj − x)
2ki − x >
p¯
2
with ki + kj > x > ki > kj >
x
2
and
p¯
2
>
p¯(ki + kj − x)
2ki − x > 0 >
p¯(ki + kj − x)
2kj − x with ki + kj > x > ki >
x
2
> kj
yields the following two lemmas 3 and 4
Lemma 3 With ki + kj > x > ki > x2 > kj it depends on the size of the
discrete unit ε in which the price bids can be given which Nash equilibria exist
for the alternative game with the pay-off function given in (7) if t→ 0:
(i) With ε < p¯(ki+kj−x)
2ki−x multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist with
(pi, pj) chosen such that pi < p¯− ε and pj < p¯− ε.
(ii) With ε = p¯(ki+kj−x)
2ki−x multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist with
(pi, pj) chosen such that either pi < p¯− ε or pi = p¯ and pj < p¯− ε.
(iii) With ε > p¯(ki+kj−x)
2ki−x multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist with
(pi, pj) chosen such that pi = p¯ and pj < p¯− ε.
Lemma 4 With ki + kj > x > ki > kj > x2 there exist multiple Nash
equilibria in pure strategies for the alternative game with the pay-off function
given in (7) and t → 0 for all ε < p¯/2 which imply that (pi, pj) are chosen
such that pi < p¯− ε and pj < p¯− ε.
Now suppose t ∈ (0, 1), then the pay-off of firm i with i, j = A,B and j 6= i
for the alternative game given in (7) depends on the price bid chosen by the
rival j. The pay-off is given by
ui(pi, p¯, t,mj) =

(1− t)pii(pi,mj) + tpi(x− kj) if pj < pi ≤ p¯,
(1− t)pii(pi,mj) + tpj(x−kj+ki)2 if pi = pj
(1− t)pii(pi,mj) + tpjki if pi < pj.
(11)
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where pii(pi,mj) is defined in (10) and i, j = A,B, i 6= j. Analysing firm i’s
pay-off function for all potential pj and assuming ki > kj yields firm i’s best
response function. One can distinguish two cases:
(i) With ki+kj > x > ki > x2 > kj and ε >
p¯(ki+kj−x)
2ki−x firm i’s best response
for all t ∈ (0, 1) is
bi(pj)
{
< pj if pj ≥ pj(t),
= p¯ if pj ≤ pj(t),
(12)
where p
j
(t) is defined as
p
j
(t) = p¯ {p¯(ki + kj − x) [x− kj − ki(1− t)] (13)
+ε
[
2k2i (1− t) + (1 + t)(x− kj)x+ ki(2kj − (3− t)x)
]}
· 1
kit [p¯(ki + kj − x) + 2ε(x− ki)] .
Note that p
j
(1) = p
j
as defined in proposition 1.
(ii) With ki+kj > x > ki > kj > x2 firm i’s best response function depends
on the level of t. For 0 < t ≤ ti(ε) where ti(ε) is defined in (8) it is
given by
bi(pj)
{
< pj if pj ≥ (p¯−2ε)(x−kj)ki ,
= p¯− 2ε if pj ≤ (p¯−2ε)(x−kj)ki .
For t ≥ ti(ε) firm i′s best response is again represented by (12).
Firm j’s best response depends always on the level of t and is given by
bj(pi)
{
< pi if pi ≥ (p¯−2ε)(x−ki)kj ,
= p¯ if pi ≤ (p¯−2ε)(x−ki)kj ,
if 0 < t < t˜j(ε) with
t˜j(ε) = p¯(p¯− ε)(ki + kj − x)2 (14)
· 1
p¯2(ki + kj − x)2 + 2εp¯(x− ki)(ki + kj − x) + 4ε2(x− ki)(x− kj) .
For t˜j(ε) ≤ t ≤ t¯j(ε) where t¯j(ε) is given by (9) firm j’s best response function
is
bj(pi)
{
< pi if pi ≥ pˆi(t),
= p¯− ε if pi ≤ pˆi(t),
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where pˆi(t) is given by
pˆi(t) = (p¯− ε) {p¯(ki + kj − x) [(x− ki)(1 + t)− kj(1− t)] (15)
+4εt(x− ki)(x− kj)}
· 1
2kjt [p¯(ki + kj − x) + 2ε] .
Finally, for t¯j(ε) ≤ t ≤ 1, firm j’s best response function is given by
bj(pi)
{
< pi if pi ≥ pi(t),
= p¯ if pi ≤ pi(t),
where p
i
(t) from the perspective of firm j is the equivalent to p
j
(t) from the
perspective of firm i, meaning
p
i
(t) = p¯ {p¯(ki + kj − x) [x− ki − kj(1− t)] (16)
+ε
[
2k2j (1− t) + (1 + t)(x− ki)x+ kj(2ki − (3− t)x)
]}
· 1
kjt [p¯(ki + kj − x) + 2ε(x− kj)] .
Again p
i
(1) = p
i
holds, where p
i
is defined in proposition 1. From the analysis
of firm i’s and firm j’s best responses we can derive lemma 5 and lemma 6.
Lemma 5 The Nash equilibria with (pi, pj) = (p¯, pj) and pj < pj(t) exist
(i) for all t ∈ [0, 1] if ki + kj > x > ki > x2 > kj and ε ≥ p¯(ki+kj−x)2ki−x and
(ii) for all t ∈ [ti, 1], where ti is defined in (8), if either ki + kj > x >
ki >
x
2
> kj and ε <
p¯(ki+kj−x)
2ki−x or if ki + kj > x > ki > kj ≥ x2 and
0 < ε < p¯/2.
Lemma 6 The Nash equilibria with (pi, pj) = (pi, p¯) and pi < pi(t) exist for
all t ∈ [t¯j(), 1], where t¯j() is defined in (9), and for all kj ≤ ki < x < ki+kj
and 0 < ε < p¯/2.
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